Meta, the company that develops WhatsApp, recently reported an intentional slowdown and attempts by the authorities to block the service in Russia. Among the objectives of this operation would be the desire to force a mass migration of users towards “Max”, a state-controlled super-app. Analyzing the situation from a purely technical point of view, we find ourselves faced with a phenomenon that goes far beyond politics: it is the construction of a fragmented Internet, the so-called “Splinternet”. In this article we will analyze how it is technically possible for a government to “turn off” an app for millions of people, which data packet filtering technologies are used and what countermeasures are adopted by users, including the use of VPNs (Virtual Private Network), i.e. encrypted tunnels that allow you to circumvent geographical barriers, and alternative decentralized protocols, such as those used by BitChat, which exploit peer-to-peer networks to make communications uncensorable.
Why does WhatsApp no longer work in Russia?
Meta reported anomalies in data traffic from Russia, interpreting them as a deliberate attempt to degrade the service to the point of making it unusable. According to the company’s statements, the Kremlin’s goal is to push citizens towards the domestic digital ecosystem, in particular the Max app, which is developed locally and heavily promoted by state media. From an infrastructure perspective, Moscow justifies these actions by citing the refusal of Western platforms to locate servers, i.e. to store user data physically on Russian soil, as required by national data security laws.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed that the functioning of WhatsApp depends exclusively on Meta’s willingness to adapt to these regulations, suggesting that the domestic alternative Max is perfectly capable of replacing foreign services. At the BBCPeskov stated that the decision was made «due to (Meta’s) reluctance to comply with the norms and the letter of Russian law» adding that Meta could solve the matter «respecting (the law) and entering into dialogue (with the authorities)».
Cybersecurity experts and digital activists, however, have strong doubts about the security of these state apps, suspecting the lack of end-to-end encryption (a technology that makes messages readable only to the sender and recipient) and the presence of backdoors for government surveillance.
How an app like WhatsApp is blocked
But, technically, how is an application blocked on a national scale? Governments don’t simply flip a switch, of course. Regulatory authorities, such as Roskomnadzor in Russia or the operators of the Great Firewall in China, use sophisticated methods. The first level is the DNS block (Domain Name System), which prevents devices from translating “whatsapp.com” into the numeric IP address needed to connect to the platform.
The most invasive and effective method probably remains DPI, or Deep Packet Inspection. Imagine Internet traffic like a series of postal envelopes: normally, providers only read the destination address. With DPI, the government network infrastructure ideally opens the digital envelopes in real time, analyzes the “payload” (the content of the data) and, if it recognizes the digital “signature” of protocols such as those of WhatsApp or Telegram, discards the packet, interrupting the communication. This explains why, in many cases, apps don’t stop working suddenly, but suffer extreme slowdowns (or throttling), making it impossible to send files or make voice calls.
This strategy is not exclusive to Russia, let’s be clear. We have observed similar dynamics in Turkey, where throttling is activated during internal crises to limit the spread of videos, or in Iran, where access to the Play Store and messaging services is cut off at the root. Nepal also recently blocked TikTok citing security concerns, while China has perfected a system over the years that completely isolates its citizens from the global internet.
Users’ strategies for bypassing blocks
Users’ response to these blocks is a constant chase between cops and robbers. The main defense tool is the VPN. A VPN does nothing more than create a secure “tunnel” within the public internet connection: the data is encrypted and sent to a server located in another country. In the eyes of the government’s DPI system, the traffic appears as a mass of indecipherable data headed to a generic server overseas, making selective blocking difficult (but not impossible).
As governments learn to recognize and block even standard VPN protocols, a new technological frontier is emerging: decentralized networks. Solutions like Bitchat or other blockchain-based platforms or local mesh networks operate differently. Instead of passing through a central server (which can be blocked or shut down), messages travel directly from device to device (peer-to-peer), often bouncing between network nodes. This makes the infrastructure much more resilient to centralized censorship, as there is no single “address” to block.
These solutions do not always solve the problems completely. If we take the specific case of Bitchat, in fact, we must consider the limited range with which it is possible to send and receive communications, which is in the order of a few hundred meters (in optimal conditions), as it uses Bluetooth to “bounce” encrypted messages from one device to another.
