Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party lost the elections, defeated by the opposition Tisza party, led by Peter Magyar. This is a historic result – not only for Budapest but also for the internal dynamics of the European Union – which puts an end to 16 years of government under the leadership of Orban, during which the prime minister managed to greatly centralize power, coming to control the media, the judicial system and various state bodies.
The victory of the centrist party was overwhelming, even higher than expected: Tisza obtained 138 seats out of 199 (with over 53% of the votes), while Fidesz stopped at 55 seats, with 37% of the votes. The third party to enter Parliament was the far-right Mi Hazank, which obtained only 6 seats. In practice, this means that Magyar will be able to count on a 2/3 majority in Parliament, necessary to amend the Constitution and intervene on the so-called “cardinal laws”, which regulate the functioning of state institutions and bodies.
Orban’s defeat also represents a severe blow for Trump’s United States (with vice president JD Vance having personally traveled to Hungary to support the prime minister) and for Putin’s Russia, with Orban representing the only Russian ally within the EU.
What made the vote even more significant was the record turnout, with 77.8% of eligible voters going to the polls: this is the highest turnout since the end of communism in 1989.
The news was immediately welcomed by the leaders of the European Union, with whom relations had become increasingly tense also due to the pro-Russian positions of the Hungarian government: now, however, it is not certain that Orban’s foreign policy line will be completely overturned by Magyar (who, in the past, was a member of the now former prime minister’s party).
Who is in Peter Magyar and what led to his victory
Born in Budapest on 16 March 1981, Peter Magyar comes from a family of the Hungarian Christian Democratic establishment: from a political point of view, he has long been a member of Orban’s party, Fidesz (without ever obtaining positions of great responsibility) and remains, in fact, a conservative exponent with several analysts who have dubbed him a “baby Orban”.
Magyar’s political turning point came in 2024 when, after abandoning his previous public roles, he founded the Tisza party to run in the European elections that year, obtaining around 30% of the vote.
But what made the difference in the 2026 political elections were above all two elements of internal politics: the fight against corruption and the relaunch of the economy. During its electoral campaign, in fact, Magyar’s party presented itself as a third political way, leveraging the stop to state corruption, the need for internal reforms to relaunch the Hungarian economy and, above all, the refusal to ally itself with the old opposition, effectively managing to create the image of a new party capable of gathering the consensus of a very varied electorate, from progressives to conservatives disappointed by Orban.
It is precisely the economy, in fact, that has made Orban’s system vulnerable: to be clear, despite the fact that between 2005 and 2025 the real Hungarian GDP grew by 40%, in 2023 the Hungarian economy entered a recession (-0.8% of GDP), with inflation at an average of 17% per year, the highest figure in the entire EU. Then, in 2024, real growth returned to positive but remained weak (+0.7%) and, after two years of limited growth, GDP is expected to grow by only 2% in 2026 and 2027, with inflation fluctuating around 4-4.5%.
What changes for the EU with Orban’s defeat
But, so, what could change for the European Union with Orban’s defeat? Over the past 16 years, the Prime Minister had become the symbol par excellence of what he himself had called an “illiberal democracy”, whose policies were often at odds with the founding values of the European Union, including respect for fundamental human rights.
Strengthened by the parliamentary majority obtained in 2010, Orban had rewritten the Constitution in 2011 and modified hundreds of laws, sending hundreds of judges into forced retirement, rewriting the electoral rules, taking control of around 80% of the national media and placing the main guarantee institutions, from the Constitutional Court to the National Prosecutor’s Office, under the control of loyalists. Precisely for these reasons, in 2022 the European Parliament defined the Hungarian regime as a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy”, with the European Commission having suspended billions of euros of funds intended for the country for violations of the rule of law.
At this point, the first effect of this defeat could concern support for Ukraine: for years the Hungarian prime minister was the only EU leader to systematically oppose military aid to Kiev, to maintain close relations with Vladimir Putin and to block a 90 billion euro European loan intended for Ukraine. With Magyar in power, analysts expect greater European cohesion on the Ukrainian front and, above all, the release of these funds destined for Kiev.
The second effect, perhaps the most important for the Hungarian economy, concerns the frozen European funds. If the new government actually implements the anti-corruption reforms promised during the election campaign, Brussels could release the billions of euros currently suspended, giving the Hungarian economy the possibility of a concrete economic revival. More specifically, among these funds there would also be a package of subsidies of around 10 billion euros – for which state intervention is required by the end of August – as well as rearmament loans amounting to 16 billion euros.
It is not certain that Hungary’s foreign policy will be overturned
Although the European Union celebrated Orban’s defeat in Hungary, it is not certain that the political line adopted by Magyar will overturn the legacy of the last 16 years: in fact, several question marks remain open about the figure of Peter Magyar and the political line he will adopt in the coming months.
The first concerns his ideological position: Magyar is neither a progressive nor a liberal, but a centre-right conservative, who has built his political rise by leveraging the need for a “functioning Hungary”, avoiding taking clear sides on the most ideologically divisive issues.
Secondly, its foreign policy line is not yet entirely clear. Although Magyar is considered more pro-European and less close to Russia than Orbán, the future prime minister has never provided specific details on his position regarding the conflict in Ukraine, the relationship with Russia or economic cooperation with China. His electoral programme, as we have seen, focused above all on internal priorities such as anti-corruption, healthcare, education and the economy, leaving the international political line still partially in the shade.
It remains to be seen how much and how quickly Magyar will be able to dismantle the institutional apparatus built by Orban in 16 years of power. Despite the two-thirds majority, in fact, many key state bodies (from the Constitutional Court to the Prosecutor’s Office up to the authority that regulates the media) are occupied by figures appointed by the Fidesz party, who will remain in office for years to come.
In short, despite the end of the Orban era, it is not certain that there will be a total upheaval of the political line in Hungary, at least for the first post-election period.
