The accident of theAir India 171 It is one of the most serious accidents of the last twenty years: on 12 June 2025 at 13:38, a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner Starting from Ahmedabad and directed to London he crashed a few minutes after take -off causing the death of 241 of the 242 people on board and 29 other on the ground. It is the first fatal accident for this model and the causes are still unknown. Various entities are questioning the incident, to understand if there has been a fault and above all to understand how to prevent it from happening again in the future. The black boxes will be fundamental for the investigation, which will be able to give us precise information on what happened. It seems that they have been recovered in good condition and a complete report will be expected will be produced by the end of the year.
Although episodes of this type can generate restlessness, it is important to remember that planes are equipped with different safety systems ready to intervene or report possible errors and malfunctions. In addition, a series of protocols, controls and precautions are arranged which play a fundamental role in preventing or minimizing damage. We therefore analyze the possible causes to highlight what are the tools and procedures that come into operation to guarantee our safety.
The role of flaps in the Air India accident
One of the possible most discussed causes is that relating to anincorrect flap configuration pre-party. It would be a rather rare eventuality: the pilots must in fact perform a pre-hull checklist which includes the correct positioning of flaps and Slats. In addition, in case this is bypassed, in planes such as the Boeing 787-8 the pilots would receive a report from theEicas (Engine Indicting and Crew Alerting System), a system of communication of information to the pilot consisting of different screens, with information on the settings and the status of the components.
If the first notice was ignored and take off, the Takeoff Conference System It would automatically perform a test and, again detecting the incorrect configuration, would send a new input to the ICAS, which would indicate the error with a red warning accompanied by a sound alarm. Not realizing it would therefore be unlikely and the procedure provides that, if the speed is reduced and the stopping space is sufficient, theInterruption of the take -off procedure. If, on the other hand, we are outside the parameters to break the maneuver would proceed with take -off.
This would not necessarily represent a critical error: with flaps in a wrong position, the plane is more difficult to take off, but, once succeeded, it should be able to continue taking altitude.
In case of speed and attack angle, do not comply with the situation, however, this would make the condition of stall. In addition, the setting of flaps to a higher value would entail excessive aerodynamic resistance and therefore high consumption; On the contrary, a lower setting would require a greater speed to perform the rotation (maneuver with which the plane detaches from the ground).
In some videos of the incident, it is clear that The cart is not retracted: This can make one think that one of the two pilots may have made a mistake and have opened the flap lever instead of that of the trolley. In this way not only the wings do not generate more sufficient liftbut the aerodynamic resistance Del cart contributes to aggravating the situation.
This hypothesis, albeit possible, is not very realistic, because the levers are distant and different from each other and such an error would soon be reported by Eicas.
The possibility of a mechanical failure is also present. The planes, however, are subjected to rigid maintenance checks And they have an architecture that minimizes damage in case of breakage. Flaps, for example, are controlled by two different computers (FSCC1 and FSCC2) to guarantee independence and redundancyand from a third that acts as a backup.
Even the actuators are redundant, in fact there are two distinct hydraulic systems that do the same job, if one breaks the other still manages to change the position of the flaps. In extreme cases there is also an emergency system with manual activation, capable of bypass any computational and mechanical problems.
The hypothesis of Dual Engine Failure as a possible cause of the disaster
Another possible cause of attention is that of Dual Engine Failure. Once again the concept of redundancy comes into play: in fact, if the broken engine had been only one, the plane would certainly have affected it, but the push would still have been sufficient to correctly take off and the subsequent flight and landing phases.
It is unlikely, however, that two engines are damaging simultaneously by pure chance. These are in fact subject, for each flight, a Visual checks and an analysis of the data of theECM (Engine Control Monitoring). More specific tests are also carried out any certain number of flight hours. To this is also added the control of theHums (Health Usage Monitoring System), able to predict the faults using the vibrational signatures.
A possible simultaneous failure is more commonly attributable to external factors, such as the Bird Strike. The planes engines are however designed to be resistant to impacts and not always the impact with a volatile disable the engine. Moreover, in this case, the filming of the take -off do not show the presence of birds during that phase, nor have they found remains on the track.
It is therefore possible that the propulsion problem was not generated by the engines itself, but by the fuel they used. The fuel It is subjected to different standards that make it highly safe in the different conditions of temperature and pressure. However, the logistics chain supply inside the airport is a vulnerable point. It is in fact possible that due to the condensation or infiltrations you enter thewater in the tanksjust as it is possible that compromises occur due to the presence of bacteria and mushroomsOf solid particles or for the contamination with other fuels.
All this may vary the chemical properties of fuel, changing their combustive efficacy, viscosity, by idle and damaging filters and engines. The consequence would be a loss of power or even the Flameout, that is, the turns off the flame in the combustion chambers.
Also in this case, safety is strongly guaranteed by daily fuel checks, by the presence of filters to eliminate particulates, by differential pressure indicators and sensors capable of detecting impurities and presence of water, as well as visual checks by specialized operators and documented traceability in the different phases.
Once the plane is supplied, any problems would be detected by a network of internal sensors and subsequently from Fadec (Full Authority Digital Engine Control), the electronic system that automatically and completes all engine parameters automatically and complete. Fadec controls the ignition and shutdown, the amount of fuel to be injected and intervenes to protect the engine in case of dangerous conditions. It is able to monitor parameters such as temperature, pressure, fuel flow and compressor speed and, if it detects anomalous values, the system immediately reports the problem through EICAS e acts independently to correct it or limit its effects.
Despite the great contribution to operational security, this autonomy can represent a risk: in rare cases, Fadec may not be able to correctly manage a critical situation, or, based on incorrect data provided by the sensors, could implement inappropriate changes to the combustion parameters, worsening or even creating the problem.
This is one of the few analyzed problems that could, alone, make the take -off impossible and, for this reason, it is considered one of the most plausible.
However, the possibilities that the fuel failure will be able to overcome all the checks, manifesting the problem only in the most critical moment and in a way that inhibits both engines, are really minimal.
In the case of failure to the engines, one of the emergency systems that comes into play is the Rat (RAM Air Turbine), a small propeller that comes out below the fuselage and uses the air to turn on itself and behave like one dynamothus allowing the plane to have sufficient anyway electricity and hydraulic pressure To continue to make the on -board systems work.
It automatically unfolds only in case of absence of the energy produced by the engines and by theApu (Auxiliary Power Unit), the auxiliary electric generator, or malfunction of electricity distribution networks.
In the videos of the AI 171 tragedy it is seen that the RAT is actually deployed.
Overload and balance may have contributed to the accident
Finally, other problems, which could compete to make take -off difficult are the overload of the plane or its incorrect balance.
The weight of the aircraft must not exceed a certain value, the MTOW (Maximum Take Off Weight); In the case of the Boeing 787-8 in its standard conformation this stands at 227.930 kg. Beyond that value the safety it is to be considered compromise For several reasons, such as the need for a Greater take -off distancea higher one difficulty in performing the rotationone Motor stress and a excessive load on the structure of the plane itself, as well as one Reduction of error margins and maneuver in case of emergency.
Not only the weightbut also his disposition It is important: the center of gravity of the plane In fact, it must be within certain limits to ensure that the flight is safe, fluid and that maneuverability is not reduced. This comes previously calculated also taking into account the weight of passengers, luggage and fuel. The on -board staff will then verify that the disposition effective is sufficiently in line with the forecastwhy, sometimes, they could ask passengers to change their places or, on the contrary, to maintain the place indicated in the ticket.
Other models also have systems that monitor, through sensors on the trolley, the actual position of the center of gravity. An incorrect positioning of the latter can lead to flagments of the plane, difficulty in performing the different maneuvers, including take -off itself, and a greater risk of stall.
The Swiss Cheese Model To explain accidents such as that of Air India
The analysis of the possible causes highlighted how the aviation sector is built on a dense network of systems designed to prevent, mitigate and manage all types of anomaly.
Each component of the plane, as well as each procedure, is the result of an in -depth study aimed at guaranteeing the maximum safety.
However, rare and complex events like this are effectively explained by Swiss Cheese Modelproposed for the first time by James Reason. Each level of security is represented as a barrier with possible imperfections. Redundant systems such as planes allow you to have some Overlapping barrierscompensating the possibility that an unexpected is critical. Thus comparing them to slices of Swiss cheese, the not very probable but still possible alignment Of the holes, which represent the flaws in the barrier, can open a passage through which an accident can materialize.
The civil aviation, aware of this dynamic, continues to study every event carefully, not only to understand its causes, but above all to further strengthen the existing systems and reduce even more the already minimal probability that similar episodes can repeat themselves.
