On paper theEuropean Union It would seem to be one military power first -rate, at least by hurrying the numbers hurriedly. However, a more careful analysis of the situation requires us to look at the overall scenario with cautious pessimism. Naked and raw numbers mask a series of macroscopic weaknesseslocated in some specific areas (traditionally delegated to our US partners), which are not easily filled in the short term. Moreover, and even more important, the absence of a common political visionof one Well defined hierarchical structure and legal automatisms at European level regarding the use of force make the unified use of the European armed forces at the moment in a hypothetical conflict practically impossible.
THE’impasse policy of a European army
The main reason why there is a lot of talk about the possibility that The European Union is involved in a large -scale reinforcement in the near future has to do with the picture of chronic international instability caused by the continuation of the Russian-Ukraine war and from the inclination of the relationships of traditional strategic partnership in place between the two banks of the Atlantic as a consequence of the foreign policy of the President of the United States of America Donald Trump. In this confused and deeply unstable situation, numerous European leaders, but also simple commentators, have asked loudly the establishment of a “European army” and a foreign and common defense policy for i 27 members of the European Union, possibly in communion with others NATO European Statesnot part of the EU, such as the United Kingdom and Norway.
If we observe the situation through the lens of the treaties that regulate the functioning of the European Union, a hint to the issue of the common defense In reality it would already exist: second Article 42 of the Treaty Establishment of the European Union (TEU)in fact, all the EU member countries provide their support, even in the military field, to guarantee the external safety of the Union, and to do so they undertake to appeal to all means at their disposal, but only upon resolution unanimously of the European Council. However, the reality observed over the years, with some European countries (first of all Hungary) that have constantly used theirs veto power To block European initiatives perceived as contrary to their national interestsleads us to the conclusion that the practice of unanimously is now unsustainable, and this would be enough to invalidate any hypothetical scenario.
Structural threats and problems
The invasion of the Republic of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the February 24, 2022 and still in progress later over 3 yearshas radically altered all the security paradigms on which strength relationships were based within the European continent and elsewhere in the whole world. When in the public discourse we speak generically of “Military threat to EU security”exactly like during the Cold Warthe gaze inevitably goes to turn east. Several commentators and analysts have emphasized that a complete victory on the Ukrainian war field would open the door to others Russian military attacks to the detriment of the neighboring European countriesin particular The three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). The focus on the victory of the Republic in part would serve to justify the continuation of the economic and military support plans a Kievin reality less and less effective with time.
To counteract a scenario of this type, the essential element is the reaction speed which, of course, clashes between the principles of consent and unanimity that reign sovereigns in Brussels. Since, outside NATO, the military defense of the European Union depends exclusively on will of the individual states And article 42 of the Tua does not have the same binding characteristics as article 5 of the NATO treaty, it is clear that the military forces of the Union would have difficulty mobilizing in time. Not only that: even if you could organize a hypothetical “Pan -European shipping body” In defense of the members attached, the fundamental problem of the Chain of command and the ultimate authority to which the “European soldiers” should obey. The answers to these questions should be given in peacetime, not in an emergency regime following an international crisis with non -well -defined and unpredictable contours.
Equally problematic is the composition of the armed forces of individual European countries. Infinite renovation process followed at the end of the Cold War has meant that today European countries are equipped with military instruments absolutely unsuitable to face a conventional war long -term against an opponent of the size of Russia. The “heavy” armies of the Cold War period have in fact left space for lighter formations, suitable for “Out of Area” missions in support of the military interventions led by the United States of America, essentially trained to operations peacekeeping or of counter -binding. In addition, the armed forces of most European countries they suffer from serious deficiencies in a whole series of sectors (for example in the field electronic) which were de facto Delegated to the United States and without which it is absolutely unthinkable today to hire a large -scale conflict. Last but not least, currently The EU is without a credible strategic deterrence system since France is the only member country of the Union to hold a autonomous nuclear arsenal But it is not yet clear how inclined Paris to make it available “Force de Frappe” (literally: “shock force”) for the common security of the other Member States.
