The new Supreme Leader of Iran is Mojtaba Khamenei, second son of Ali Khamenei, the Ayatollah who led Iran for 37 years who was killed in recent days by the bombings of the United States and Israel on Tehran. The appointment would have been made by the Assembly of Experts, following strong pressure from the Pasdaran.
Mojitaba, a 56-year-old Shiite cleric, has for years been regarded by the Israeli elite as the favorite and most influential son of the late Ayatollah, and in the inner circle of the Revolutionary Guards there were those who expected him to take his place.
But essentially, who is Mojitaba and what has he done so far?
Born in Mashhad in 1969, the second son of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei built his power away from the spotlight. After his theological studies in Qom, Mojitaba served in Habib Battalion during the bloody Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), and it is precisely during this experience that he managed to forge indissoluble bonds with the leaders of Pasdaran.
Unlike his father, Mojtaba has never held elective positions or public institutional roles, preferring to operate from within the Office of the Supreme Leader. In this headquarters of absolute power, he has worked for decades to influence strategic appointments in the areas of security and the economy.
Many claim that Mojitaba is the supervisor of the militias Basijthe paramilitary force that has killed more than 40,000 Iranians during protests in the last two months. This ruthless management of dissent, combined with the control of vast economic assets in the country, has made him the most feared and powerful man in Tehran, preparing the ground for that dynastic succession which, until a few years ago, seemed incompatible with the very principles of the Islamic Republic.
His strategy aimed at the systematic elimination of internal rivals. Sanctioned by the United States already in 2019, it has transformed international isolation into an opportunity to armor the security apparatus, making its current rise the result of ruthless ten-year planning.
His appointment as Ayatollah, which took place in the last few hours, was not free from criticism, especially towards the traditional clergy: this is because as early as 2022 the official media linked to the Qom seminaries had started referring to him with the title of “Ayatollah”, although he was not, in fact, at the time. Qom is the holy city of Iran par excellence, and is considered the “Vatican of the Shiites”: without the support of its supreme scholars, it is impossible to govern Iran as a Supreme Leader.
In any case, authoritative sources such as the Encyclopedia Britannica and other geopolitical analysts underline how this was a “political” rather than academic step: Mojtaba had in fact already been teaching advanced jurisprudence courses in Qom for some time. This official “promotion” was not liked even abroad: in fact, there was no shortage of accusations of corruption, linked to the opaque management of the family’s financial resources.
For critics, his rise represents the final betrayal of the republican ideals of 1979 in favor of a theocratic monarchy hereditary. But despite the financial shadows and the deficit of religious charisma, his iron control over the institutions silenced any internal dissent, giving him precisely the role he aspired to.
