For about 20 years a code simply consisted of 8 consecutive zeros it was the password to control the launch of nuclear missiles by the US military. But is it a true fact or a hoax invented from scratch? As surprising as this may be, it’s all true. For nearly two decades, during the height of the Cold War, the SAC (Strategic Air Command) of the United States deliberately set the launch code to eight zerosa seemingly absurd choice, but nevertheless with an internal logic. In fact, it was not a programming error or a banal oversight, but rather a conscious decision taken ensure a rapid response in the event of an attack. The history of this decision and its background is a fascinating example of how the need for security can conflict with operational urgency, and how nuclear protection measures can be influenced by political and military dynamics. What do you think if we retrace this story together?
The freezing climate of the Cold War
In the 1962the president John F. Kennedy signed the National Security Action Memorandum 160(available on this page) by ordering the installation of devices called PAL (Permissive Action Link) on all US nuclear weapons. These systems should have prevent launch without proper authorization. In fact, they were small devices that allowed missiles to be launched only using the right code, given with the right authority.
However, SAC considered the idea of such a strict lockdown a risk to its operational capacity. The main objective of the military leaders was to ensure that, in the event of an attack, the missiles could be launched without delays due to complex orders or communication difficulties with the Central Command, especially if the command channels were compromised during a nuclear attack.
The freezing climate of Cold Waras we read above Gizmodo he then pushed «the US military (…) to minimize any foreseeable delay in launching a nuclear missile, for nearly two decades intentionally set the launch codes of every silo in the United States to eight zeros».
SAC’s concerns were not entirely unfounded. During the Cold War, the possibility that a nuclear attack would devastate communications infrastructure was real. If commanders in the field had not been able to receive the launch order, the missiles would have remained inert. As a result, the SAC preferred to set up a very simple access sequence: “00000000”. The code was so important to be reported in a checklist distributed to soldierswith the instruction to check the correct setting.
Security problems due to the code “00000000”
Obviously this raised doubts due to the security issues inherent in the code “00000000”.
Among the most important reasons for concern was that relating to a possible misappropriation of US missiles by foreign governments with unstable leadership. The United States, in fact, having nuclear missiles located in various countries, could not sleep reasonably peacefully, given the relative ease with which their weapons could be used.
Another danger arose from possible arbitrary actions by US military. Many US commanders had the ability to launch nuclear weapons under their control at any time. All it took was for an American commander with mental problems to decide to start World War III to generate a colossal patatrac.
And if you think we’re exaggerating, you obviously don’t know what the US general explained Horace M. Wade about the general Thomas Power:
I was worried about General Power. I worried that General Power wasn’t stable. I worried that he had control over so many weapons and weapon systems and could, under certain conditions, launch force.
In this regard the Dr. Bruce G. Blairformer Minuteman launch officer, confirmed the ease with which it was possible, at least “on paper”, to launch nuclear missiles completely autonomously. Blair in this case reported:
Our launch checklist instructed us, as members of the launch crew, to double check the lock panel of our underground launch bunker to ensure that no digits other than zero had been inadvertently entered into the panel.
1977: the year the password “00000000” was abandoned
Despite the military logic behind the adoption of the “00000000” code, the risk associated with such lax security was enormous. The aforementioned Dr. Blair publicly denounced the issue in 1977through the article Keeping Presidents in the Nuclear Dark highlighting how PAL systems, although advertised as safe, were not yet active on many missiles. His article also highlighted the disconnect between presidential directives and SAC operational practices. Coincidentally, it was in 1977 that the codes were finally made more complex and the PAL protection systems were fully activated.
